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ABSTRACT
Investments in environmental programs have not been met with
definitive scientific evidence of their positive influence on corporate
financial performance; yet, we still see executives investing in such
programs. Given this observation, those working on environmental
issues should have a firm understanding of the factors that influence
an executive’s decision to invest, or not invest, in environmental
programs. This Article reviews the latest scientific literature on the
influence Chief Executive Officers have on firm outcomes, the
rationales for investing in environmental programs, and the executive
characteristics, social factors, and structures that play into their
decision-making process.
INTRODUCTION
Investments in environmental programs are not uniformly
implemented across firms. One potential reason is that there has not
been widely held agreement among scholars that such investments are
consistently profitable. Indeed, studies have found mixed results when
examining the impact of environmental programs—and, more
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generally, across a large swath of other socially responsible programs.1
This—combined with the observation that large-scale investments in
environmental programs are visible, potentially contestable, and open
to scrutiny—may make it difficult for some executives to choose to
make such investments. Indeed, research has shown that investing in
environmentally and socially responsible programs while firm
performance lags significantly increases the likelihood of Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) dismissal.2
Given these challenges, if we want to better understand the adoption
and implementation of environmental programs within firms, we must
understand the executives leading the firms. Research increasingly
shows the impact that CEOs have on firms. Quantifying this impact, a
2016 study showed that CEOs account for approximately twenty-two
percent of variance in firm performance.3 It is likely that CEOs explain
an even greater proportion of variance in more proximal decisions,
such as investments in environmental programs and the environmental
performance of the firm.
Against this backdrop, if we want to better understand the level of
investment in, support for, and care about the environment,
environmental lawyers and other stakeholders will have to continue to
work with leaders in the upper echelons of firms. To be effective at
this, we must continue to better understand CEOs. This Article—a
synthesis of a talk I gave at Fordham University Law Review’s
symposium titled “Corporate Sustainability in the Era of Shifting
Federal Priorities”—tries to synthesize the broad scientific literature
that examines the characteristics of CEOs, their social environment,
and other structures that lead to greater investments in environmental
programs.

1. See John Peloza, The Challenge of Measuring Financial Impacts from
Investments in Corporate Social Performance, 35 J. MGMT. 1518 (2009).
2. Timothy D. Hubbard et al., Higher Highs and Lower Lows: The Role of
Corporate Social Responsibility in CEO Dismissal, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2255,
2263 (2017).
3. Timothy J. Quigley & Scott D. Graffin, Reaffirming the CEO effect is
significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 793, 794 (2017); see also Timothy J. Quigley & Donald C. Hambrick, Has the
“CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in
America’s attention to corporate leaders, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 821 (2014).
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Overall, this Article contributes to literature and practice by
providing a framework for understanding how executives factor into
the execution of environmental and sustainability programs within
firms. I begin by discussing the rise and prominence of the CEO. Next,
I outline the current state of the literature regarding the linkage
between environmental programs and firm financial performance. I
then go through some of the motivations for making investments in
environmental programs. Finally, I review the current literature on
executive characteristics, social factors, and structural factors that
influence environmental and social performance of firms. The
overarching goal of this Article is to equip readers with an
understanding of the state of mind of executives as they navigate the
complex landscape of environmental engagement within their firm.
THE RISE AND PROMINENCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CEOs have become increasingly prominent and influential over the
past decades, achieving an almost superstar status. Prominent CEOs
such as Steve Jobs, Warren Buffett, and Jack Welch have dominated
the news and become part of everyday life for people across the world.
Indeed, their pay alone makes them newsworthy: “The median [ratio
of their chief executives’ pay to the median earnings of employees] is
127 to 1, but some of the most recognized brands are outliers.”4
Part of this hero status and commensurate compensation is deserved.
CEOs of large firms have had an increasing influence on the
performance of firms. In the 1950s and 1960s, CEOs accounted for
approximately 14% of the variance in a firm’s return on assets. This
number increased to 18% in the 1970s and 1980s and has now reached
almost 23% over the past two decades. Given this rise in the impact a
CEO has on firm financial performance—a very distal outcome—their
influence on the performance of investments in environmentally
focused programs has to be at a similar, or higher, level.
Here we need, however, a word of caution. Recent research has
shown that investments in CSR can have severe personal consequences
for CEOs.5 A study of Fortune 500 firms over a five-year period
4. Dean Baker, Can anything bring CEO pay back down to earth?, LA TIMES.
(Jun. 14, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-baker-ceo-pay20180614-story.html [https://perma.cc/N7SD-KD9U].
5. Hubbard, supra note 2, at 2263.
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showed that environmental and social performance of the firm alters
the effect that firm performance has on CEO dismissal.6 The research
showed that CEOs who invested more in these programs had greater
dismissal rates when firm financial performance was low. The effect
sizes were quite high: at low levels of financial performance, CEOs
were 84% more likely to be dismissed if they invested in these
programs. On the other hand, they were 53% less likely to be dismissed
if they had strong financial performance.
When taken together, the rise in prominence of CEOs in modern
culture, their increasing effect on firm outcomes, and the personal
consequences they face from investing in environmental programs
underscores how important it is to understand CEOs in the context of
investments and stewardship of environmental programs. Indeed, I
strongly urge those working on issues of environmental
responsibility—from lawyers to investors and regulators—to carefully
consider CEOs. They play a significant part in investing in
environmental programs and choosing to comply with environmental
laws. They do so, however, at great personal risk—especially given
the tenuous nature of the relationship between investment in
environmental programs and financial performance.
LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TO FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
There has been wide debate among scholars of strategic
management on the financial case for Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR)—including environmental programs. As my colleagues and I
have previously summarized:
Some research suggests CSR [including environmental programs]
has a positive influence on firm financial performance because it can
generate stronger relationships with stakeholders, increase customer
loyalty, and positively influence corporate reputation. Other research,
however, suggests that CSR initiatives hinder financial performance
and come at the expense of shareholders. Still other research finds no
relationship between CSR and firm financial performance (internal
citations omitted).7
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Indeed, a review by Peloza in 20098 looked at 128 studies that
explored the CSR–financial outcomes relationship and reported that
59% found a positive relationship, 27% a mixed or neutral
relationship, and 14% a negative relationship. Some of the inconsistent
findings arise because so much goes into how we define CSR and
environmental performance that it clouds the relationship. Indeed,
more proximal performance metrics include reduced use9, operational
efficiencies10, and changes in risk profile.11 These intermediate
measures were found in only twenty five of the 128 studies Peloza
examined.
While more proximal performance metrics are important, so is
dividing up the measures of environmental and social performance. If,
at the broadest level, we separate our actions into those based on
stakeholder strategies, such as environmental programs, from social
issues, such as nuclear power, we have already shown that stakeholderfocused programs have a positive effect on shareholder value
creation.12 This is in contrast to social-issue-focused programs which
diminish shareholder value.13
One recent study examined the differences between material and
immaterial investments in environmental and social programs.14 Not
all environmental programs are equally beneficial across sectors. For
example, air quality programs are deemed material in the
transportation and non-renewable resources industries, but not in
health care. On the other hand, wastewater management is material for
health care and non-renewable resources, but not transportation. The
8. Peloza, supra note 1.
9. Craig R. Carter, Purchasing social responsibility and firm performance: The

key mediating roles of organizational learning and supplier performance, 35 INT’L
J. PHYSICAL DISTRIB. & LOGISTICS MGMT. 177, 187 (2005).
10. Sanjay Sharma & Harrie Vredenburg, Proactive Corporate Environmental
Strategy and the Development of Competitively Valuable Organizational
Capabilities, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 729, 741–42 (1998).
11. Mark P. Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, Environmental Risk Management
and the Cost of Capital, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 569, 569–92 (2008).
12. Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, Shareholder Value, Stakeholder
Management, and Social Issues: What’s The Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
125, 126–29 (2001).
13. Id. at 136.
14. Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on
Materiality, 91 THE ACCOUNTING REV. 1697, 1697–724 (2016).
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authors of the study used Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(“SASB”) standards to assess the materiality on an industry-byindustry basis. The study finds that firms with good ratings on material
sustainability issues outperform firms with poor ratings on these
issues. In contrast, firms with good ratings on immaterial sustainability
issues do not significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on the
same issues. Understanding the materiality of the environmental
programs on a sector-by-sector basis can help generate a business case
that is more palatable for executives.
MOTIVATIONS FOR INVESTING IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS
Given the less than certain nature of the business case for investing
in environmental and social programs, the question remains: Why do
executives invest in sustainability? This question is especially relevant
given the current political climate where environmental regulations are
being dismantled at an unprecedented rate. Indeed, in 2016, then
United States presidential candidate Donald Trump said “We are
cutting the regulation at a tremendous clip. I would say 70% of
regulations can go.”15 Regulations did, indeed, have a material effect
on the quantity and quality of environmental programs. It is in times
like these, however, that we need to better understand the individuals
making the decisions—especially considering that they will have more
latitude as regulation decreases.
There are many reasons for executives to invest in environmental
programs including the espoused values of the firm, instrumental
motivations, the stewardship perspective of the firm’s leadership,
stakeholder-focused insurance-like motivations, and institutional and
stakeholder pressures. I will explain each of these in turn.
First, a firm’s espoused values can serve as a guidepost for
executives when making environmental decisions. Some firms have a
stronger environmental mindset and message than others. The rise of
B corporations—”a label meant to reflect a firm’s ethical, social,

15. Chris Kaufman, Republican Trump says 70 percent of federal regulations
‘can go,’ REUTERS, (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electiontrump-regulations/republican-trump-says-70-percent-of-federal-regulations-can-goidUSKCN12629R [https://perma.cc/HKG3-KJEY].
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environmental practices”16—is an example of a trend. Over 2,500
companies have been certified as B corporations as of August 2018.17
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream company was founded with social and
environmental responsibility at the core of the business and it was an
early adopter of the B corporation status. Executives of these firms are
expected to make decisions in line with those espoused values. These
types of values are, however, generally set at the founding of the
company and are extremely sticky. As a person working in or
interacting with a firm, understanding this baseline level of interest in
social programs can serve as a guidepost for how interactions on
environmental stewardship may play out.
Second, some executives have an instrumental motivation to invest
in environmental programs.18 This is founded on the business case, or
the belief in the business case for environmental investments.19 As I
discussed above, however, the business case is far from clear. As such,
the institutional motivations are difficult to identify on a broad basis.
Research is increasingly clear that believing in the relationship
between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial
performance leads to the tendency to invest in CSR.20 As future
empirical research digs deeper into the types of investments—from
material to stakeholder-focused—it can be hoped that we will see
better support for a business case for environmental programs. This is
not to say that on a project-by-project basis there are not business cases
for environmentally friendly programs at firms; instead, based on the
current state of scientific literature, the broadest of business cases is
not well established.

16. Choosing
plan
B,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
9,
2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/09/danone-rethinks-the-idea-of-thefirm [https://perma.cc/8UZF-5PTV].
17. Id.
18. Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 71
(1995).
19. Sebastian Hafenbrädl & Daniel Waeger, Ideology and the Micro-foundations
of CSR: Why Executives Believe in the Business Case for CSR and how this Affects
their CSR Engagements, 60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1582 (2017).
20. Id. at 1600.
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Third, some executives take a stewardship perspective, rather than
an economic perspective to running their firm.21 This perspective is
founded on “a moral imperative for managers to ‘do the right thing,’
without regard to how such decisions affect firm performance.”22 This
moral imperative enables executives to ignore the potential downside
risks of investing in environmental programs within their firms.
Executives that take a stewardship perspective choose to identify with
high value commitments and have higher order needs including
achievement and self-actualization.23 Stewards of their organizations
take the necessary long-term orientation to invest in environmental
programs that the self-serving economic man chooses not to. As such,
strategic management scholars use stewardship theory to explain some
of the differences in investment levels within environmental
programs.24
Fourth, there has been a lot of discussion in the strategic
management literature on the idea that investments in environmental
and social programs can have an insurance-like ability.25 In this
perspective, environmental performance can build goodwill in the
minds of stakeholders. This goodwill serves as a type of insurance that
allows for stakeholders to maintain support for organizations
following small transgressions. As such, executives can choose to
invest in environmental programs in order to protect their
organizations in the future if they happen to suffer an environmental
mishap.
Fifth, there are institutional and stakeholder pressures to take a more
environmental and social approach to business. A recent example
typifies this type of pressure. In January 2018, numerous CEOs
received letters from Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock—the world’s
largest investment management firm. In that letter Mr. Fink asked

21. See James H. Davis et al., Toward a stewardship theory of management, 22
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20 (1977)
22. Abagail McWilliams et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic
Implications, 43 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1, 3 (2006).
23. Davis, supra note 21, at 28.
24. See Davis, supra note 21.
25. See Paul C. Godfrey et al., The Relationship between Corporate Social
Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the Risk Management
Hypothesis, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 425 (2009).
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CEOs “How are we managing our impact on the environment?”26 The
letter received wide attention27 and is an exemplar of the potential
influence that institutions and stakeholders can have on the future
environmental performance of firms.
Finally, one interesting and potentially fruitful line of investigation
on the antecedents of investments in environmental programs is the
study of the personal dispositions of executives making these
decisions. That is, there is something about the executives themselves
leads them to tend to invest more or less in sustainability. The next
section delves deeper into the current strategic management literature
focused on individual differences of CEOs and how they manifest in
decisions to invest in environmental and social performance.
EXECUTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
Research into the characteristics of executives has yielded many
fruitful findings in the broad strategic management literature.28 Only
recently, however, has there been major work on understanding how
the individual differences that CEOs possess influence their choice to
invest in environmental and social programs. At this point in the
strategic management literature, most studies focus on the broad
construct of CSR or Corporate Social Performance (CSP).29 Within
that construct lies the focus of this essay: firm environmental
responsibility, investment, and performance. Typically, at best, these
studies publish supplemental results that separate out environmental
performance from the other broad categories. Thus, some of the
findings reported here investigate the broader construct of CSR, the
results, however, should still be applicable in the context of
environmental investment and performance.
26. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
BLACKROCK (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larryfink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/NQ76-DFT5].
27. Interview with John Ydstie, Correspondent, NPR (Jan. 16, 2018) (transcript
available
at
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/16/578422424/blackrock-ceo-sayscompanies-need-to-do-more-than-deliver-profits [https://perma.cc/G7RP-WU75]).
28. SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN ET. AL., STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: THEORY AND
RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVES, TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS, AND BOARDS (2009).
29. Herman Aguinis & Ante Glavas, What We Know and Don’t Know About
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda, 38 J. MGMT. 932
(2012).
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Studies on executive decision making are typically founded in two
theoretical streams: those which focus on the agency of the executive30
and those which focus on how individual differences influence
information processing.31 Both of these theories allow for executive
characteristics to influence firm decisions. In this section, I review
recent studies that examine how political ideology, narcissism, hubris,
charisma, ability, intellectual stimulation, and fair market ideology all
influence an executive’s choice to invest in environmental and social
programs.
Political ideology is defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper
order of society and how it can be achieved.”32 Two factors play an
important role in aligning an executive with either a more liberal or
more conservative orientation.33 First, executives differ on their level
of openness versus resistance to change. Second, they differ on their
acceptance versus rejection of inequality. Both of these two factors
form an executive’s overall political ideology. Ideology has been
linked to many outcomes in strategic management such as tax
avoidance,34 research and development investment,35 and CEO pay.
Political ideology—both at the CEO level36 and the organizational
level37—has also seen support for influencing corporate social
30. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECONS., 305
(1976); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency theory: An Assessment and Review, 14
ACAD. MGMT. REV., 57–74 (1989).
31. See Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The
Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193 (1984).
32. Robert S. Erikson & Kent L. Tedin, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 64 (Taylor
& Francis, 6th ed. 2000).
33. John T. Jost et al., Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective
Affinities, 60 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOL. 307 (2009).
34. See Dane M. Christensen et al., Top management conservatism and corporate
risk strategies: Evidence from managers’ personal political orientation and
corporate tax avoidance, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.1918 (2014).
35. See Irena Hutton et al., Corporate Policies of Republican Managers, 49 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1279 (2014).
36. See M.K. Chin et al., Political Ideologies of CEOs: The Influence of
Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 197
(2013).
37. See Abhinav Gupta et al., Red, blue, and purple firms: Organizational
political ideology and corporate social responsibility, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1018
(2017).
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responsibility. Political ideologies of CEOs are manifested in their
firms’ CSR profiles with more liberal CEOs having higher scores in
Corporate Social Performance—of which environmental performance
is one indicator. This effect was shown to be amplified by the CEO’s
level of power within the organization. It is also important to note that
more conservative CEOs are more willing to invest in CSR when
recent firm performance is high; liberal CEOs’ CSR performance, on
the other hand, is less contingent on recent performance. When
interacting with executives, environmental lawyers may wish to
consider the executive’s political ideology—especially given its power
to predict a firm’s environmental and social performance and the
convenience and accessibility of records of political donations.
Personality factors also contribute to CEO decision making and
investment strategies. Narcissism is a personality factor that has
received much attention in the strategic management literature.38
Narcissists “have a high need for attention and praise as well as a
strong desire to have their positive self-views reinforced.”39 They need
their self-image to be reinforced constantly from external sources. As
mentioned above, investments in Corporate Social Responsibly are
highly visible. As such, research has shown that firms led by
narcissistic CEOs have higher levels of Corporate Social Performance.
40
This effect, however, has to be taken into context. Narcissists tend
to invest in programs that derive public praise, not necessarily because
of their linkage to a business case. As such, their firm’s financial
performance suffers as they make more investments in CSR. Their
media profile, however, increases dramatically. Thus, overall, when
working with narcissistic CEOs, framing environmental investment
decisions as worthy of public praise may be one tool to influence them.

38. See David H. Zhu & Guoli Chen, CEO Narcissism and the Impact of Prior
Board Experience on Corporate Strategy, 60 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 31 (2015); William J.
Wales et al., In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism, Entrepreneurial Orientation,
and Firm Performance Variance, 50 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1041 (2013);
Pankaj C. Patel & Danielle Cooper, The harder they fall, the faster they rise:
Approach and avoidance focus in narcissistic CEOs, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 35,
1528 (2013).
39. Oleg V. Petrenko et al., Corporate Social Responsibility or CEO Narcissism?
CSR Motivations and Organizational Performance, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 262,
263 (2016).
40. Id.
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Hubris is another psychological factor that plays an important role
in CEO decision making. Hubris is defined as extreme pride coupled
with immense self-confidence.41 Recent research divided
environmental and social performance into responsible and
irresponsible activities.42 Researchers examined CEOs of Standard &
Poor 1500 firms over a decade. Their results showed that CEO hubris
leads to higher levels of irresponsible investments (defined as concerns
in Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc. ratings) and lower level of
responsible investments (those categorized as strengths in the
rankings).43 Hubristic CEOs prefer to make investments that are not
dependent on other stakeholders—such as environmental programs—
in order to maintain control of their organizations. Furthermore, they
prefer internal financing and are poor at estimating how much
resources are required for specific investments. As such, they have a
double handicap: they overestimate how much environmental
programs would cost and assume that they would only have internal
resources available for such investments.
Charismatic CEOs are characterized by their ability to influence
followers and build a shared organizational identity.44 Their ability to
set a vision for the company is accompanied by their ability to have
that vision permeate throughout their organization. Furthermore,
charismatic CEOs tend to espouse prosocial values. These prosocial
values—including, as Wowak and colleagues describe, “integrity,
justice, and marinating societal good”—increase the likelihood that
CEOs will consider many different stakeholders in their decisionmaking process, leading to a tendency for charismatic CEOs to
perform better on environmentally and socially responsible

41. Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums
Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 106
(1997); see also Nathan J. Hiller & Donald C. Hambrick, Conceptualizing executive
hubris: The role of (hyper-)core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making, 26
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 297 (2005).
42. Yi Tang et al., How CEO Hubris Affects Corporate Social (Ir)responsibility,
36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1338, 1339 (2015).
43. Id. at 1348–51.
44. Adam J. Wowak et al., Earthquake or Glacier? How CEO Charisma
Manifests in Firm Strategy Over Time, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 586, 588 (2016).
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dimensions.45 These effects have been shown to increase over the
tenure of a charismatic CEO. Charismatic leaders, therefore, have the
benefit of looking at environmental issues from a number of different
perspectives and being able to influence their organizations to
implement environmental solutions.
CEO ability, or the capability of a CEO to translate firm resources
into profits, is another factor that has been shown to have an influence
on the level of Corporate Social Performance.46 Investments in
environmental and social programs are complex and may take time to
materialize into financial returns—if at all. Given the relationship
between CSR and CEO dismissal, investing in CSR has to be coupled
with strong financial performance, lest a CEO face dismissal. CEO
ability—their latent overall quality—thus enables certain CEOs to
make investments in these programs. They are the ones who are better
positioned to capitalize on these investments and steward them
through their lifecycles. These CEOs are also typically on longer time
horizons; that is, they don’t need to demonstrate extremely short-term
profits like CEOs with lower abilities. This all leads to higher
environmental and social performance.
CEO intellectual stimulation is another factor that has been shown
to influence CSR decisions. CEO intellectual stimulation “involves
leader actions geared toward the arousal and change in problem
awareness and problem solving on the part of followers, as well as
beliefs and values.”47 Research has shown a positive relationship
between CEO intellectual stimulation and what the authors term
“strategic CSR,” of which environmental performance is the strongest
component.48 Leaders with higher levels of intellectual stimulation
will consider the environment more broadly and possess complex
mental maps that allow them to move beyond basic profit and loss
strategies.
Finally, a recent study investigated the role that fair market ideology
has in the tendency for executives to engage in environmentally and
45. David A. Waldman et al., Components of CEO Transformational Leadership
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 43 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1703, 1707 (2006);
Wowak et al., supra note 43, at 591.
46. Yuan Yuan et al., CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility, J. BUS.
ETHICS. 1 (July 2017)
47. Waldman et al., supra note 44, at 1709.
48. Id. at 1715–17.
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socially responsible programs.49 Fair market ideology is one’s
proclivity to support, even idealize, the market economy system. It is
typically formed early in life, through formal education. Fair market
ideology influences two mediators that explain the relationship to the
tendency to invest in environment and social programs. First, it helps
strengthen the belief in the linkage between CSR and corporate
financial performance. Instead of relying on a factual business case for
environmental programs, an executive’s worldview is able to
substitute. Second, fair market ideology reduces moral outrage. It does
this by lowering an executive’s moral emotions—that is, reducing their
awareness of moral issues. This reduction in moral outrage cancels out
the effect of belief in fair market ideology on the tendency to invest in
environmental and social programs within firms. Overall, the study
shows that executives who have a strong belief in fair market values
are subject to opposing influences vis-à-vis investments in
environmental programs. Stakeholders working with these executives
should be aware that they are predisposed to believe in the business
case, and that this case can be strengthened by focusing on the moral
aspects of environmental protections.
SOCIAL FACTORS
Another interesting line of research examines the social factors
surrounding investment in and performance of environmental
programs. CEOs do not make decisions in a vacuum. Instead, they are
surrounded by their families, shareholders, stakeholders, and their
company’s boards of directors. Each of these groups has been shown
to have an influence on firm-level environmental and social
performance.
In one of the more interesting studies, researchers have investigated
the influence that having a daughter has on the decision for CEOs to
invest in CSR—including performance in environmental practices.50
This research is rooted in the female socialization hypothesis that

49. Hafenbrädl et al., supra note 19, at 1599.
50. See Henrik Cronqvist & Frank Yu, Shaped by their daughters: Executives,

female socialization, and corporate social responsibility, 126 J. FIN. ECONS., 543
(2017).
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“suggests an attitudinal shift arises from parenting daughters.”51 When
a firm’s CEO has a daughter, the level of environmental performance
is about 5.2% higher, compared to a median firm.
Another social factor is shareholder activism—the process by which
shareholders use shareholder proposals to express their disapproval of
a firm’s actions.52 In a recent survey of 300 directors of United States
publicly traded firms, over eighty percent of directors agreed with the
statement that activism creates a “negative distraction for management
and the board.”53 Furthermore, while it is potentially intuitive that
shareholders may use shareholder proposals to increase the level of
environmental and social performance within the firm, research shows
that the opposite often occurs.54 The authors of the study explain that
“rather than pressuring firms to improve [Corporate Social
Performance], activism may merely engender diversion of resources
away from [Corporate Social Performance] into political activities
used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion.”55
Powerful stakeholders also serve as another social influencer on the
behavior of CEOs. The CEO hubris study discussed above had another
finding that has implications for the social effects of stakeholders. The
researchers showed that dependence on stakeholders for resources
dampens the negative effects of hubris on environmental and social
investments.56 Resource dependence, thus, can serve as a social check
on CEOs who, based on their personality, may be ill-disposed to
engage in responsible investments, while preferring irresponsible
investments.

51. Ebonya L. Washington, Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their
Legislator Fathers’ Voting on Women’s Issues, 98 AM. ECON. ASS’N 311, 313
(2008).
52. See Maria Goranova & Lori Verstegen Ryan, Shareholder Activism: A
Multidisciplinary Review, 40 J. OF MGMT. 1230 (2014).
53. NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVICES, THE EFFECT OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ON
CORPORATE
STRATEGY:
A
2016
NYSE
GOVERNANCE
SERVICES/EVERCORE/SPENCER
STUART
SURVEY
REPORT
4
(2016),
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/Shareholder_Engagement_Survey_Report_2016.
pdf [https://perma.cc/UYW3-5VFX].
54. See David Parthiban et al., Investor activism, managerial responsiveness, and
corporate social performance, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 91 (2007).
55. Id. at 97.
56. Tang, supra note 40, at 1352.
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The board capital—the collective experience, knowledge, and
networks of the directors serving on a corporation’s board—has been
shown to be an influential factor on increasing the level of
environmental disclosure in firms.57 Boards with high levels of human
and social capital are able to advise CEOs better than those with lower
levels of board capital. They are able to take a wider view of the
company and the environment—and consider multiple stakeholders
more effectively. As such, they are more likely to be able to recognize
the benefits of environmental disclosures and convince executives to
implement such disclosures.
STRUCTURES
Another factor that can play into a CEO’s choice to invest in
programs to support the natural environment is the pay structure of the
executive.58 Specifically, the short-term and long-term pay structure
influence the level of performance of environmental programs. Shortterm pay includes, for example, the bonuses awarded to a CEO in a
given year. Long-term pay includes restricted stock and stock options.
The results of an analysis of the Standard & Poor’s 500 firms in 2001
show that short-term-focused pay decreases the level of performance
in environmentally friendly programs, while long-term-focused pay
increases the level.59 This provides evidence that the compensation a
CEO receives does have influence on their propensity to invest in and
steward environmentally friendly programs within their firms.
Beyond the compensation structure of the CEO, the structure of the
firm can have an impact on the level of CSR, including
environmentally friendly programs.60 Decentralization—“when
decision-making power involves individuals at various organizational
levels”61—shifts decision making from a few key people down to
57. Mohammad Badrul Muttakin et al., The Effect of Board Capital and CEO
Power on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, 150 J. BUS. ETHICS 41, 53
(2018).
58. John R. Deckop et al., The Effects of CEO Pay Structure on Corporate Social
Performance, 32 J. MGMT. 329 (2006).
59. Id.
60. Elaine M. Wong, Margaret E. Ormiston & Philip E. Tetlock, The Effects of
Top Management Team Integrative Complexity and Decentralized Decision Making
on Corporate Social Performance, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1207 (2011).
61. Id. at 1210.
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many individual managers. These individual managers are then better
able to integrate local knowledge and understand stakeholders at a
more nuanced level than top managers. This leads them to implement
more environmentally and socially friendly programs. This effect is
then carried across the firm and, as has been shown in a study of
Fortune 500 firms from the late 1990s to early 2000s, leads to higher
levels of investments in such programs.62
Another structural determinant of the level of social and
environmental activities is the age of the firm.63 Young ventures—
those less than eight years old64—suffer from a liability of newness,
whereby they “lack sophisticated operating processes and routines,
systems and structures for efficient internal communications, and the
knowledge to establish stable relationships with clients, suppliers, and
other stakeholders.” 65 Their liability of newness makes it difficult for
them to appropriate value from their social and environmental
activities. We see in young ventures that CSR activities don’t yield
greater financial performance. A long-term orientation, however, is
one mechanism that can overcome the negative relationship between
CSR and financial performance for young ventures. Long-term
orientations focus on the future, encompass a wider field of vision, and
are typically associated with more complex investments. This shifts
investments from more superficial investments to those that have a
longer-term, more impactful effect on financial performance. As
stakeholders work with young firms, an understanding of their
temporal orientation can help convince managers of the economic
value of environmental investments and programs.
CONCLUSION
Executives are a critical factor in deciding to invest in environmental
programs, stewarding those programs, and managing the relationships
necessary to make them successful. Implementing these programs
62. Id.
63. Taiyuan Wang & Pratima Bansal, Social Responsibility in New Ventures:

Profiting from a Long-Term Orientation, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1135 (2012).
64. Shaker A. Zahra, Technology Strategy and New Venture Performance: A
Study of Corporate-Sponsored and Independent Biotechnology Ventures, 11 J. BUS.
VENTURING 289 (1996).
65. Wang & Bansal, supra note 62, at 1137–38.
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does not come without their personal risks—poor performance
following higher levels of environmental and social performance is a
major determinant of CEO dismissal.66 As I have shown, a number of
different factors play important roles in the mind of the manager.
Personality factors such as narcissism, hubris and charisma all
influence CEO decisions. Their values—such as liberalism and fair
market ideology—shape their world view, and their decisions
regarding environmental investments. Finally, cognitive factors such
as their ability and intellectual stimulation weigh in on their capacity
to deliver on environmental projects. Beyond these individual factors,
social factors are also important. I reviewed articles that showed that
daughters, shareholder activists, and powerful stakeholders all serve as
influencers of executive decisions in this area. Finally, there are
structural factors that are important such as a CEO’s pay structure, the
centralization of the organization, and the age and time orientation of
the firm. While the studies I have reviewed typically examine each
factor in isolation, the consistency of their predictions with other
factors shows broad trends that can help those working with a variety
of executives to better understand how they think about complex
environmental projects.

66. Hubbard et al., supra note 2, at 2255.
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Table: Summary of CEO Factors Influencing Environmental
Investment and Performance
Category
Factors that Increase Environmental and Social Performance
Personality Factors
CEO Liberalism (Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 2013)
CEO Narcissism (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge & Hill, 2016)
CEO Hubris [reduces] (Tang, Qian, Chen & Shen, 2015)
CEO Charisma (Wowak et al., 2016)
CEO Ability (Yuan, Tian, Lu & Yu, 2017)
CEO Intellectual Stimulation (Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006)
Fair Market Ideology (Hafenbradl & Waeger, 2017)
Social Factors
Having a Daughter (Cronqvist & Yu, 2017)
Shareholder Activism [reduces] (David, Bloom & Hillman, 2007)
Powerful Stakeholders (Tang, Qian, Chen & Shen, 2015)
Board Capital (Muttakin, Khan & Mihret, 2018)
Structural Factors
CEO Long-Term Pay Structure (Deckop, Merriman & Gupta, 2006)
Decentralized Structure (Wong, Ormiston & Tetlock, 2011)
Long-Term Orientation (Wang & Bansal, 2012)

